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Abstract
Cheap micro-controllers, such as the Arduino or other controllers based
on the Atmel AVR CPUs are being deployed in a wide variety of projects,
ranging from sensors networks to robotic submarines. In this paper, we
investigate the feasibility of using the Arduino as a true random number
generator (TRNG). The Arduino Reference Manual recommends using it
to seed a pseudo random number generator (PRNG) due to its ability to
read random atmospheric noise from its analog pins. This is an enticing
application since true bits of entropy are hard to come by. Unfortunately,
we show by statistical methods that the atmospheric noise of an Arduino
is largely predictable in a variety of settings, and is thus a weak source
of entropy. We explore various methods to extract true randomness from
the micro-controller and conclude that it should not be used to produce
randomness from its analog pins.
1 Introduction
Various aspects in our lives may seem random — so thinking that generating
randomness might seem easy at first glance. But when one inquires further one
quickly realizes that due to the deterministic nature of CPUs, it is impossible
for them to generate random numbers.
However, there is a great need for unpredictable values in cryptography. Ker-
ckhoff’s principle states that “a cryptosystem should be secure even if everything
about the system, except the key, is public knowledge”. Almost all encryption
schemes rely on the notion of secret keys so those keys must be generated in an
unpredictable way, or else the encryption scheme is useless. Examples of this
are the keystream in a one-time-pad, the primes in the RSA algorithm and the
challenges used in a challenge-response system [8, 1]. Many secure encryption
protocols use nonces (numbers used once) to add “noise” to messages [1]. If
these numbers are predictable, the nonces do not serve much purpose.
Since regular computers are unable to produce truly random numbers, psue-
dorandom number generators (denoted PRNG) are the name of the game. A
PRNG is a one-way function f the generates random sequnces, of either inte-
gers or bits, from an intial seed s and then applies the function iteratively to
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generate the sequence [8]. In a cryptographic system, a weak source for the
seed weakens the whole system. It may allow an adversary to break it, as was
perhaps most notably demonstrated by breaking the method that the Netscape
browser used to seed its PRNG [5].
Thus a PRNG can only be random if its seed is truly random and its output
is only a function of the seed data, the actual entropy of the output can never
exceed that of the seed. However, it is generally computationally infeasible to
distinguish between a good PRNG and a perfect RNG. A true random number
generator (TRNG) uses a non-deterministic source to produce randomness e.g.
measuring chaotic systems in nature like thermal noise, shot noise or flicker
noise, which are all present in resistors [6]. Using background radiation and a
Geiger counter is an appealing option, but expensive1 and thus unavailable for
the public.
Figure 1: Arduino Duemilanove
The Arduino is a free and open-source electronics single-board micro-controller
with an Atmel AVR CPU. There are several different versions of the board avail-
able2, but we used the Arduino Duemilanove3 board (with the ATMega328 [3]
micro-controller) for this research. The Arduino toolkit has the analogRead
function that reads from a given analog pin on the board and returns a 10-bit
integer. This function maps input voltages between 5 and 0 volts to integers in
the range [0..1023]. This is what we tried to use in order to extract entropy.
Micro-controllers like the Arduino are heavily used in e.g. sensor networks
[10] where data integrity is a key issue. It follows that the demand for high
1A simple search on Amazon.com reveals that a USB connected Geiger counter costs about
$300
2See: http://arduino.cc/en/Main/Boards
3See: http://arduino.cc/en/Main/ArduinoBoardDuemilanove for full specifications
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quality entropy is rather high in those situations.
The Arduino Reference Manual suggests that reading from an unconnected
analog pin gives a “fairly random” number [2], ideal for seeding the avr-libc
PRNG4. We will later show that the numbers are generally not random, and
that the reading from an unconnected pin provides very limited entropy. We
will also show that building a RNG with the Arduino is infeasible and that if
you follow the Arduino Reference Manual, the sheer lack of possible seeds makes
it relatively easy for an adversary to guess the seed. We will provide a proof of
concept tool for doing such guesswork automatically.
We also attempt to build a random bit generator from the Arduino (without
adding extra hardware). We will pose and discuss a few algorithms and discuss
how they perform statistically speaking testing and how they fare at extracting
entropy. Ultimately, we were unable to identify any such method which rises
concerns over the use of Arduino as a TRNG.
1.1 Contributions
The contributions of this work are the following:
• We implement the monobit, poker and runs statistical tests in the Python
programming language, as well as code that exposes an Arduino to these
tests. (Section 3.2.)
• We provide a program that given a sequence from the avr-libc PRNG
seeded with a value from the analogRead-function on an Arduino, deter-
mines the seed value. It was done by first analyzing data from the Arduino
and building a probability distribution of the values. The program either
collects data directly from the Arduino first or can be supplied with a
data set. We supply a typical data set with the code. This includes an
implementation of the avr-libc random function. (Section 5.2.)
• We rebut the claim made by the Arduino manufactures that analogRead
returns “fairly random” integers [2]. (Section 5.1.)
All of the Ardrand code is free software and is maintained at http://
gitorious.org/benediktkr/ardrand
2 Related Work - Background
Hardware random number generators have been designed with various methods.
The search for external entropy has lead researchers down imaginative paths.
Air turbulence in hard drives [4], which is proven to be a chaotic phe-
nomenon, has been used as a source for random numbers. The raw disk times
where both structured and correlated. The authors used the Fast Fourier trans-
form algorithm to remove bias and correlation. The worst case observed bitrate
was 100 bits/minute.
Intel CPUs contain an on-board RNG [6] chip. It samples thermal noise,
shot noise and flicker noise, all of which are present in resistors. The voltage
4Archival of this claim: http://web.archive.org/web/20110428064453/http://arduino.
cc/en/Reference/RandomSeed
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measured across undriven resistors is amplified, but these measurements are
correlated to enviromental charasteristics, such as electromagnetic radiation,
temperature and power supply fluctuations. The random source used is derived
from two free-running oscillators, one fast and one much slower. The thermal
noise is used to modulate the frequenciy of the slower clock. The erratic ticks
of the slow clock is then used to trigger measurements of the faster one.
Drift between the two clocks is used as a source for binary random digits.
The initial measurements are then processed by the von Neumann box. On
average, one bit is generated for every 6 raw binary samples.
The limitations of using hard drives as a source of entropy is that not all
computers have hard drives, for instance special-purpose hardware like routers or
switches. As solid state drives (SSD) become more available, not even all general
purpose computers have spinning hard drives any more. Routers and other
special purpose hardware do not have exeternal sources for entropy, other than
network traffic, which may be observeable or even controllable by an adversary.
One example of this is the OpenWRT router [12]. Since it is based on
Linux, it uses the Linux Random Number Generator (LRNG), /dev/random
and /dev/urandom. It provides cryptographic services such as SSH, SSL and
wireless encryption. It lacks entropy sources other than network interrupts.
It has no mouse or keyboard, so it is impossible to use any user interaction
to collect entropy. Although this is not part of the LRNG itself, almost all
distributions include a script that saves the state of the LRNG between reboots.
This is done so that when the operating system starts, the LRNG has a fresh
starting state. The OpenWRT distribution does not do this and thus the LRNG
state is reset to a predictable state on every reboot, only determined by time
of day and a constant string. This example demonstrates that there is need for
external entropy sources.
3 Theoretical Considerations
We begin by making the notions of “fairly random” and “statistically random”
more precise by defining statistical tests for sequences of integers. Let us first
define a few terms, following the exposition by Menezes et al. [8].
Definition 1. A random bit generator (RBG) is a device or algorithm that
outputs a sequence of statistically independent and unbiased binary digits.
A random bit generator can easily be used to generate random numbers. To
obtain an integer in the interval [0, n] we can simply generate blg nc+1 bits and
cast over to an integer. If the result exceeds n, one option is to discard it and
generate a new number.
Definition 2. A pseudorandom random bit generator (PRBG) is a determin-
istic algorithm or program that given a truly random binary sequence of length
k, outputs a binary sequence that appears to be random. The input to the PRGB
is called the seed, while the output is called a pseudorandom bit sequence.
Note that the output from a PRBG is not random in the colloquial sense
of the word. Given the deterministic nature of the algorithm, it will always
produce the same sequence for any given seed value.
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Definition 3. Let s be a binary sequence. We say that a run in s of length n
is a subsequence consisting of either n consecutive 0’s or n consecutive 1’s. A
run is neither preceded or proceeded by the same symbol. We call a run of 1’s a
block and a run of 0’s a gap.
Definition 4. Let s be a binary sequence of length n such that s = s0, . . . , sn−1
and let pi be the probability that si = 1 for any i. Way say that the generator
generating s is biased if pi 6= 12 .
Determining what is random and what is not is a deep philosophical question
— proving mathematically that a generator is indeed generating random bits is
impossible [8]. Measuring randomness is as much a philosophical question as it
is a mathematical one. There are however statistical tests that allow us to detect
certain weaknesses a RBG might have. Note that just because a bit sequence
from a generator is accepted by the statistical tests, there is no guarantee that it
is indeed random. On the other hand, if it is rejected, we can say with certainty
that it is non-random. In other word, when a bit sequence is “accepted” it really
is “not rejected”.
3.1 Statistical significance
We interpret the results of the statistical tests by means of the χ2-distributions.
It is used in the common χ2-tests to assess the goodness-of-fit. The χ2 distri-
bution with k degrees of freedom is given by
f(x, k) =
{
1
2k/2Γ(k/2)
xk/2−1e−x/2, x ≥ 0;
0, otherwise.
where Γ is the gamma-function, given by
Γ(n) = (n− 1)!.
Then we can take our observed data and find an χ2 statistic, denoted X2,
such that
X2 =
k∑
i
(Oi − Ei)2
Ei
for all i, where Ei denotes the expected number of occurrences and Oi de-
notes the observed number of occurrences. Then the number X2 tells us about
the significance of the test, given a significance level α. This is usually done by
means of a table of percentiles.
The degrees of freedom is the number of variables that are free to vary. It
is worth noting that if we have m different values in our calculations, we can
often figure out the mth variable from the m− 1 other values, so then we would
have k = m− 1 degrees of freedom. This is often the case for our tests, such as
the Monobit test we will define below.
3.2 Statistical tests
Here we present a few statistical tests we used. We measured against the spec-
ifications set forth in FIPS-140-1 [9, 8] rather than selecting the significance
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levels ourselves. The motivation is that the FIPS document effectively sets a
standard for the tests to satisfy and we therefore have something to measure
against. There are several others tests available and NIST has published paper
[7] that outlines a few tests such as the DIEHARD5 test suite, the tests outlined
by Donald Knuth in The Art of Computer Programming and the Universal
Statistical Test by Mauer [11]
Let s = s0, s1, . . . , sn−1 be a binary sequence of length n. A single bitstring
of length n = 20000 from our generator is subjected to each of these tests. If any
one of the tests fail, we conclude that the output of our generator is non-random.
3.2.1 Monobit test
In a random bit sequence, one would expect that the number of 1’s and 0’s are
about the same. This test gives us a statistic on this distribution. Let n0 denote
the number of 0’s and n1 the number of 1’s. We then find the statistic
X1 =
(n0 − n1)2
2
(1)
which approximately follows a χ2 distribution with 1 degree of freedom
(given n and n0 we can easily figure out n1).
3.2.2 Poker test
The poker test tests for certain sequences of five numbers (bits) at a time,
similar to a hand in poker. In a random sequence we would expect that each
hand would appear approximately the same number of times in s. Let m be a
positive integer such that ⌊ n
m
⌋
≥ 5 · 2m
and let k = b nmc. We divide the sequence s into k disjoint parts of length m
and let ni denote the number of sequences of “type” i.
For a binary sequence si ∈ s, where |si| = m, we let ni be the number of
sequences where i equals the decimal representation of si. Note that 0 ≤ i ≤ 2m.
The statistic used is then
X3 =
2m
k
(
2m∑
i=1
n2i
)
− k (2)
which approximately follows a χ2 distribution with 2k−2 degrees of freedom
(df).
3.2.3 Runs test
The runs test determines if the number of runs (see Definition 3 ) in s is what
is expected of a random sequences. The expected number of gaps, or blocks, of
length i in a sequence of length n is
ei =
n− i+ 3
2i+2
.
5See http://stat.fsu.edu/~geo/diehard.html
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Let k be equal to the largest integer i for which ei ≥ 5, or k = maxi ei ≥ 5.
Let Bi, Gi be the number of blocks and gaps, respectively, of length i, for each
1 ≤ i ≤ k. The statistic used is then
X4 =
k∑
i=1
(Bi − ei)2
ei
+
k∑
i=1
(Gi − ei)2
ei
(3)
which approximately follows a χ2 distribution with 2k-2 degrees of freedom.
We note that this exactly finds the χ2 statistic since the number of runs is the
sum of all gaps and blocks.
3.3 FIPS140-1 bounds
We use the FIPS-140-1 bounds [9] for the tests of our Arduino RBG. Let s be a
bit sequence of length 20,000. The documents states explicit bounds as follows:
Monobit test The test is passed if 9.654 < X1 < 10.346 and the number n1
of 1’s should satisfy 9654 < n1 < 10346. Should follow a χ2 with 1 degree
of freedom.
Poker test The statistic X3 is computed for m = 4 and the test is passed if
1.03 < X3 < 57.4. Should follow a χ2 with 15 df.
Runs test We count the number of blocks and gaps of length i — Bi and Gi
respectively — in the sequence s, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ 6. For the purpose
of this test, runs longer than 6 are truncated to length 6 [9]. The test
is passed if the number of runs is each within the corresponding intervals
below in table 1. The bounds must hold for both blocks and gaps, all 12
counts must lie within the bounds. The distribution should follow a χ2
with 16 df.
Length of run Required Interval
1 2267 - 2733
2 1079 - 1421
3 502 - 748
4 223 - 403
5 90 - 223
6 90 - 223
Table 1: Required intervals for runs test as specified by FIPS-140-1
Long runs test The long runs test is passed if there are no runs of length
greater than 34 in the bit sequence s.
3.4 Decorrelation with the von Neumann box
Decorrelation is a term that refers to reducing autocorrelation, the similarity
between observations as a function of the time separation between them. This
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should not be observed in a random sequence, since the very definition of ran-
domness implies differences in the sequence. A source of randomness may be
faulty in that the output of it is either biased or correlated.
Suppose that the probability that a RBG generates a 1 with a probability
p and a 0 with probability 1− p, where p is unknown but fixed. We group the
output of the generator into pairs of two bits. The pairs 00 and 11 are discarded,
and a 10-pair is transformed to a 1-bit while a 01-pair is transformed into a 0.
This procedure is called the von Neumann-corrector [8, 6] or von Neumann-box.
3.5 Algorithms used to try to extract entropy from the
Arduino
We implemented several algorithms in our search for entropy. These are de-
scriptions of our algorithms.
The Mean-RAND algorithm is implemented by keeping a list of the k last
values and their mean. Then we compare the new reading to the mean and
evalute to 0 if it is less, otherwise 1. To remove bias and reduce correlation we
run it through the von Neumann-box.
Listing 1: The Mean-RAND algorithm in Python esque pseudocode
de f meanrand (n ) :
buf = deque ( [ 0 ] ∗ k )
f o r i in [ 0 . . k ] :
buf . push ( analogRead ( ) )
meanval = sum( buf )/ l en ( buf )
f o r i in [ 0 . . n ] :
meanval −= buf . pop ( )/ k
buf . push ( analogRead ( ) )
meanval += buf [−1]/k
m = c e i l (meanval )
y i e l d vNbox(1 i f analogRead ( ) > m e l s e 0)
The Updown-RAND algorithm first reads an initial value v0 which is then used
to determine if the next bit value v1 is 1 if v1 > v0 and 0 otherwise. We do this
twice, i.e. we collect v1,0 and v1,1 and compare them with the von Neumann
box until we obtain a legit bit. This algorithm showed low performance and
bandwidth, and has consistently failed the statistical tests.
Listing 2: The Updown-RAND algorithm
de f updownrand (n ) :
v0 = analogRead ( )
f o r i in [ 0 . . n ] :
y i e l d vNbox(1 i f analogRead ( ) > v0 e l s e 0)
The MixMeanUpdown-RAND algorithm acquires one bit from Mean-RAND and
one from Updown-RAND and XORs them together to produce a new bit. Since this
method is dependent on Updown-RAND it performs even worse, both in regards
to bandwidth and entropy.
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Listing 3: The MixMeanUpdown-RAND algorithm
de f mixmeanupdown(n ) :
m = meanrand ( )
u = updownrand ( )
f o r i in [ 0 . . n ] :
y i e l d vNbox(m. next ()^u . next ( ) )
Let a = a9 . . . a1a0 be the binary representation of a 10-bit integer read
from the analogRead-function on the Arduino. The Leastsign-RAND algorithm
simply yields the least significant bit a0. As expected, this algorithm shows
greater performance and some promise in regards to randomness. We use the
von Neumann-box for decorrelating the output.
Listing 4: The Leastsign-RAND algorithm
de f mixmeanupdown(n ) :
f o r i in [ 0 . . n ] :
y i e l d vNbox( analogRead ()&1)
The TwoLeastsign-RAND algorithm works in a very similar fashion. Instead
of just using the least significant bit, we use the two least significant bits a0 and
a1, XOR them together and run through the von Neumann-box. This algorithm
has shown the greatest potential for entropy and has also been implemented on
the Arduino itself.
Listing 5: The TwoLeastsign-RAND algorithm
de f two l e a s t s i gn (n ) :
f o r i in [ 0 . . n ] :
y i e l d vNbox( analogRead ()&1^( analogRead()>>1)&1)
3.6 NIST Security Levels
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST, America) has defined [9]
four basic security levels for cryptographic modules, such as RBGs and RNGs,
as well as explicit bounds for statistical tests a RBG must satisfy. The security
levels can be outlined as follows
Security level 1 is the lowest level of security that specifies basic requirements
for a cryptographic module. No physical mechanisms are required in the
module beyond protection-grade equipment. It allows software cryptog-
raphy functions to be performed by a regular computer. Examples of
systems of level 1 include Integrated Circuit Boards and add-on security
products.
Security level 2 adds the requirement for tamper-proof coatings and seals, or
pick-resistant locks. The coatings or seals would be placed on the module
so that it would have to be broken in order to attain physical access to
the device. It also adds the requirement that a module must authenticate
that an operator is authorized to assume as specific role.
Security level 3 extends the requirements of level 2 to prevent the intruder
from gaining access to critical security parameters within the module and
if a cover is opened or removed, the critical parameters are erased.
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Security level 4 is the highest level of security. It protects the module from
compromise of its security by environmental factors, such as voltage or
temperature fluctuations. If one attempts to cut through an enclosing
of the module, it should detect this attempt and erase all sensitive data.
Most existing products do not meet this level of security.
Although we were not aiming for physical security in this scenario, aiming
for security level 1 seems like a reasonable decision. Note that in order for a
device to conform to any of the security modules it has be able to perform self-
tests, both at request and start-up. We implemented the tests in the Python
programming language on a general-purpose computer.
FIPS140-1 specifies that the sample must be 20,000 bits, or 2.5KB. But
the Arduino Duemilanove only has 2 KB of RAM. Luckily, it has a 32KB Flash
memory which could be utilized to implement the statistical tests on the Arduino
itself.
4 Experimental Results
We began by analyzing the output of the function analogRead on the Arduino
in various different settings. We found that the output is dependent on several
environmental factors, some of which are unknown to us. Reading from different
pins gives different scopes of values, but the behavior is the same. We will show
graphs of all pins on one Arduino connected to two computers to back this
claim, see Figure 2. The computer to which the Arduino is connected to affects
the results. On one computer tested, one of our algorithms produces sequences
that were not rejected by the statistical tests.
We want to know if, and by how much, the environment affects the results.
We also investigate how and if we can use the analogRead output to find entropy
and how we test for randomness.
4.1 Computers and devices used in research
The output of the function analogRead on the Arduino is somewhat dependent
on the environment in which it resides. We subjected the Arduino boards to
different conditions, such as putting it in the freezer or on top of a hot heating
element.
These are descriptions of the computers used for the experiments.
• A no-name desktop computer with a Gigabyte GA-MA69GM-S2H moth-
erboard. This machine runs the Debian GNU/Linux testing/wheezer op-
erating system.
• A Dell D505 laptop. This machine runs the Ubuntu GNU/Linux Maverick
Meekat 11.04 operating system.
• A Dell D620 laptop. This machine runs the Ubuntu GNU/Linux Maverick
Meekat 11.04 operating system as well.
We found that both the laptops showed same or similar behavior, both on
raw outputs and statistical testing, but the desktop differed. It is unclear what
aspects trigger the deviations but we will discuss this point further in section
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(a) Sample from Ard3 taken on the desktop computer (b) Sample from Ard3 taken on the D620
Figure 2: Readings from Ard3 taken over all pins on both a desktop computer
and a D620 laptop.
4.3. For our research we used three identical Arduino Duemilanove boards with
the ATMega 328 micro-controller. To distinguish between them, we call them
ard1, ard2 and ard3. These names are also used to distinguish between them in
our data samples.
4.2 Analysis of analogRead
Our first hypothesis was the space and volume of the area that the Arduino
resided in affected the values. If we look at Figure 3 we can see that the
environment lays some role and that where you place it definitely has effect on
the output. The figure shows readings taken in various different places — in
an open space, a closed cupboard, inside a computer case and in a larger open
space.
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Figure 3: Readings from ard1 connected to the desktop. Samples are taken
inside a small cupboard, in a fairly large room, a large living room and inside
the desktop computer case itself.
Moreover, by looking at the graph it becomes evident that there is limited
entropy available. Note the drop at the beginning; it does not appear for all
computers, e.g. specifically when connected to the D620 laptop (see Figure 4).
It should be noted that the data originates from the same Arduino device, in
the same setting. The only factor is the computer used.
Our experiments have shown that the output is fairly regular and if we look
at Figure 5, showing more limited ranges of readings, we see that the structure
and apparent lack of entropy. The readings should have been heavily influenced
by analog noise [2]. This is further investigated in section 5.1.
Note the interference patterns in e.g. figures 7b and 6 — they show up
more clearly in the case of the temperature experiments since we see a much
wider range of values. Although we are not sure what causes these patterns,
electrical fluctuations are a potential candidate. These patterns might also be
a product of the analog pins themselves, or their manufacturing process. The
exact physical causes for this phenomenon appear complex and are beyond the
scope of this paper.
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Figure 4: Readings from ard3 connected to the D620 laptop
Figure 5: 200 readings from ard1 connected to the desktop computer
4.2.1 Effects of temperature
Temperature is a key environmental factor. We see a much broader range of
values when the Arduino is operating in heat or cold. The figures 6, 7b and
7a show the output from analogRead in various temperature conditions of the
extreme kinds. Note that Figure 7b only has 10000 values, as opposed to the
50000 values in all the other figures. This is because the Arduino simply stops
working after a few minutes at −11◦C. Arduino have not released any infor-
mation regarding operating temperatures but according to AVR the operating
temperatures for the ATMega 328 micro-controller is −40◦C to 85◦C [3]. One
of our Arduino boards (ard1) broke after spending 4 hours in the freezer at
−12◦C, so we conclude that some other component(s) on the board survive less
cold than the micro-controller itself.
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Figure 6: Readings on top of a hot heating element (approx. 40C) connected
to a Dell D505
(a) Fridge (approx. 1C) (b) Freexer (approx. -11C)
Figure 7: Readings in cold temperatures with a Dell D505 laptop
4.3 Harvesting entropy and statistical testing
We subject the output of the RAND algorithms described in section 3.5 to the
statistical tests described in section 3.2. These are our results using the three
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different computers used in our experiments.
We used a baudrate of 115200 bps, fast available for the Arduino over the
FTDI RS232-to-USB connection, in these experiments for maximum bandwidth.
The maximum reading rate of analogRead is about 10000 times per second
[2]. When we read6 iteratively from analogRead over USB, pyserial will raise
either an OSError or SerialException. This happens approximately once every
500 times and reading the pyserial source code7 we find a comment stating that
“disconnected devices, at least on Linux, show the behavior that they are always
ready to read immediately but reading returns nothing”. We therefore conclude
that these exceptions are the result of analogRead blocking for moment.
These are the results of our RAND algorithms using all three computers, sub-
jected to the FIPS boundaries. Each bit sequence tested is n = 20000 bits long
and each recorded result is the average of three consecutive runs. Green means
Accepted and red Rejected.
4.3.1 Results with Desktop computer
Algorithm Monobit Poker Runs Long runs Bandwidth
Leastsign n1 = 9947 X3 = 869.44 Rejected Accepted 290.55 bps
Twoleastsign n1 = 10027 X3 = 1290.05 Rejected Accepted 133.6 bps
Mean n1 = 9979 X3 = 149.87 Rejected Accepted 85.34 bps
Updown n1 = 8352 X3 = 1959.2 Rejected Accepted 3.87 bps
Table 2: Statistical tests on desktop
4.3.2 Results with the D620 laptop
Algorithm Monobit Poker Runs Long runs Bandwidth
Leastsign n1 = 10006 X3 = 34.59 (Rejected) Accepted 290.55 bps
Twoleastsign n1 = 10027 X3 = 10.36 Accepted Accepted 172.0 bps
Mean n1 = 10030 X3 = 4743, 17 Rejected Accepted 25.32 bps
Table 3: Statistical test on D620 laptop
We can see that the Twoleastsign-RAND algorithm here produces sequences
that are not rejected as being non-random. The Leastsign-RAND algorithm is
a little less consistent since it is rejected by the tuns tests some of the time.
We have exposed sequences that pass our statistical tests to a statistical test
suite made available by NIST8. This suite consists of 15 tests, some of which
are also implemented by us. We found that when a sequences passes our tests,
it will also pass all the NIST tests. This implies that it is possible to generate
random bits on the Arduino, but it relies on external factors that are not fully
6See poll.py in the Ardrand codebase
7See http://www.java2s.com/Open-Source/Python/Development/pySerial/pyserial-2.
5-rc2/serial/serialposix.py.htm
8See http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/rng/index.html
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understood by us. Our best guess is that the voltage from the USB connection
on the computer influences the regularity of the analogRead readings.
As we can see in Figure 4 and 2b, analogRead is producing different pat-
terns (and no initial drop) on this computer, compared to the desktop computer.
Note the drop on pin 3 in the beginning. Curiously, the Twoleastsign-RAND
algorithm will fail when we choose pin 3. There is no guarantee that these
sequences are truly random, they have just not been rejected as non-random.
This shows that using some computers, the Arduino could possibly work as a
RBG. But for a device to be a RBG, it has to work using all PC hardware, in
all settings.
4.3.3 Results with the D505 laptop
Algorithm Monobit Poker Runs Long runs Bandwidth
Leastsign n1 = 10033 X3 = 27.4 Failed Accepted 473.32 bps
Twoleastsign n1 = 10080 X3 = 18.68 (Accepted) Accepted 240.0 bps
Mean n1 = 9980 X3 = 3365.65 Rejected Accepted 27.1 bps
Table 4: Statistical with the D505 laptop
This computer has shown inconsistent test results and sequences produced by
it will sometimes be accepted by the poker and runs tests, while sometimes
they are not. As before, the causes for this are unknown to us and open for
speculations.
5 Breaking the Arduino as a RNG
This section is twofold. We will both show that using the analogRead function
to seed the avr-libc PRNG does not give adequate security and we also exhibit
proof-of-concept code that finds such a seed value, given a sequence from the
PRNG.
5.1 Refuting the claims made by Arduino
The Arduino Reference Manual [2] states the following in the section about
the randomSeed function. This claim is at the time of writing found in the
manual, and is available via The Internet Archive9. The reference manual is
only available online.
“If it is important for a sequence of values generated by random()
to differ, on subsequent executions of a sketch, use randomSeed() to
initialize the random number generator with a fairly random input,
such as analogRead() on an unconnected pin.”
After having visually examined the raw output with the graphs in the section
above, we clearly saw that the output is very likely non-random and not even
9See http://web.archive.org/web/20110428064453/http://arduino.cc/en/Reference/
RandomSeed
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“fairly random” as claimed. This would also explain the troubles we had in
devising an algorithm that produces random bits.
The first issue with analogRead is that it only returns 10-bit integers, since
it reads from the 10-bit analog-to-digital converter on the Arduino board10. It
then follows trivially that if you use analogRead to seed the PRNG, there are
only 210 = 1024 seed values for an adversary to explore.
As we can see from Figure 2 there are only roughly 100-400 values that show
up, but it is worth noting that using different pins give us different scopes of
values. Note the drop when using the desktop but not the D620 laptop.
We exposed the output from analogRead to the same statistical tests as our
RAND algorithms. In order to use the FIPS-bounds to measure against we needed
20 000 bits, or 2000 10-bit integers that we converted to binary. We state the
null hypothesis as follows,
H0 = The output from analogRead is "statistically random"
and show that the results are statistically significant and we can reject it
as non-random. Note that the Arduino developers claim that the output is
“fairly random” and not “statistically random”. These are the average over three
consecutive runs in setting 0.
Statistical test X statistic Accepted Required X interval
Monobit 903.847 Rejected 9.964 < X1 < 10.346
Poker 3211.45 Rejected 1.03 < X3 < 57.4
Runs 2812.81 Rejected Lengths of runs used
Table 5: Results of the statistical test applied to analogRead output
We see that all of the statistics are far off from the FIPS requirements so we
can safely conclude that the null hypothesis H0 is false and analogRead is not
even “fairly random”.
We note that the observed bitrate for reading values directly from analogRead
is 17531 bps11.
5.2 Finding the seed
This limited range of possible values from analogRead cuts down on search time
for the seed. As we have seen, there are only a few hundred values that show
up most of the time, although these values may vary. We have designed proof-
of-concept code12 that given a sequence from the avr-libc (Arduino) PRNG,
finds the seed — assuming it was generated by analogRead.
The avr-libc PRNG is a Linear congruential generator defined by the re-
currence relation13
Xn+1 ≡ 75 ·Xn (mod 231 − 1).
10See http://arduino.cc/en/Reference/AnalogRead
11Baudrate 115200 bps
12Implemented in the file seedfind.py in the Ardrand codebase
13Resides in libc/stdlib/random.c in avr-libc-1.7.1 and a Python implementation is found
at avrlibcrandom.py in the Ardrand codebase
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In order to account for the diversity in values that the Arduino returns in
various settings, our implementation inputs either a text file of samples or can
connect to an Arduino board and collect fresh samples. To provide the same
interface, this is implemented by means of inherited classes in the code.
Let C denote the number of calls a program has made to the PRNG in order
to generate a sequence s. Let m be our best-guess or estimation of the unknown
C. Our program inputs s and m, as well as a sample source. It then builds a list
of values in the range [0, 1023], sorted by the frequency by which they appear
in the given sample. Let P denote this list of probability distribution values.
We then create one bidirectional queue for each of the 1024 values in P. Let
k be the length of the sequence s. For all i ∈ P we create a deque with k pseudo
random integers derived from i as a seed. Then we iterate over P and generate
k + m integers for each deque (holding k values at a time) until we find the
sequence.
Here is pseudo-code for our program. The functions srandom and random are
the seeding function for the avr-libc PRNG and random function, respectively.
Listing 6: Finding the seed
de f f i nd s e ed ( s , m, samplesource ) :
k = len ( s )
l a s t k = [ deque ( ) ]∗1024
P = bui ldProbDist ( samplesource )
# Expand all the deques by k elements from P[i] as seed
f o r i in P:
srandom ( i )
l a s t k [ i ] = deque ( [ random ( ) f o r _ in range (k ) ] )
# Did we receive a sequence derived directly from the seed?
i f l a s t k [ i ] == s :
re turn i
whi l e True :
f o r i in P:
f o r _ in range (m+k ) :
srandom ( l a s t k [ i ] [ −1 ] )
v = random ( )
l a s t k [ i ] . popfront ( )
l a s t k [ i ] . append (v )
i f l a s t k [ i ] == s :
re turn i
This program has running bounds given by O(C), since it has a endless
while-loop, only bounded by C. The running time is thus not bounded by the
O(m + k) loop, since that is only an estimation or best-guess of how long it
takes to find the correct seed.
5.2.1 Possible optimizations
While this program runs reasonably fast in practice, one can think of optimiza-
tions of the code. Let G a sorted list of observed values in the sample source.
Then one variation of the findseed program might generate sequences from
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each value g ∈ G as seed for some constant time t before moving on to the less
likelier values that are in P −G, the unobserved values. Thus we would spend t
times more time on the more probable values. The while loop of this variation
would look like
Listing 7: One possible optimization of the findseed program
. . .
whi l e True :
# Iterate over a sorted list of the observed values
f o r i in G:
f o r _ in range ( t ∗(m+k ) ) :
expand ( l a s t k [ i ] )
i f l a s t k [ i ] == s :
re turn i
# Check the unobserved values, but spend less time there
f o r i in P−G:
f o r _ i range (m+k ) :
expand ( l a s t k [ i ] )
i f l a s t k [ i ] == s :
re turn i
de f expand ( que ) :
srandom ( que [−1])
v = random ( )
que . popfront ( )
l a s t k [ i ] . append (v )
In order to determine the efficiency of our program, we first pseudo-randomly
select an integer d such that 1 ≤ d ≤ 1000 with the Python PRNG. Then
we generate a sequence s = s1, . . . , sd+100 with the avr-libc and pass the
subsequence sd+1, . . . , sd+100 to our program. To seed the PRNG, we use the
Python PRNG to select a analogRead value from a file of samples collected
from an Arduino. We did this 5000 times and our program found the seed in
every case, with a mean time of 1.6 seconds14 spent on each sequence.
6 Conclusions
The primary goal of this project was to investigate the feasibility of using vanilla
Arduino Duemilanove boards without add-on hardware as cheap RBG devices,
in hopes of building a true hardware random number generator. Early on, we
realized that there simply wasn’t enough entropy available to build a RBG. Most
to our surprise, we found that using some of our computers, the Arduino seems
to work as a RBG when using the Twoleastsign-RAND algorithm. The resulting
strings were not rejected by our implemented statistical tests that had rejected
all other sequences we tried. It should be noted that due to the very nature of
randomness, we cannot say for sure that it is indeed producing random bits —
we can only state that it was not rejected as non-random. But since this is only
the case using specific hardware, we must reject the Arduino as a RBG since it
is not universal.
14Using a computer with an AMD Athlon 64 X2 4000+ Dual Core Processor
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Since it is only not rejected using a certain hardware, we have ultimately
shown that these boards are not ideal devices for this task. Instead we have
refuted the claim made by Arduino themselves and devised a program to find
the seed when the onboard PRNG is seeded with analogRead, as recommended
by Arduino.
In future work, the exact nature of the ports read byanalogRead should
be investigated with respect to the environment or USB connectors. It also
remains open to find a cheap, readily available hardware that produce random
statistically unbiased random numbers quickly.
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